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The Gloucestershire Extension of Medical Services
Scheme: An Experiment in the Integration
of Health Services in Britain
before the NHS
MARTIN GORSKY*
Introduction
One of the animating beliefs of British health service reformers in the first half of the
twentieth century was that delivery would improve if greater co-ordination was imposed
over disparate providers. The fundamental divisions were between the voluntary, public
and private sectors. Voluntary provision predominantly meant acute care hospitals, but also
included a range of other therapeutic and clinical services. The public sector delivered
general practitioner (GP) services to insured workers through the state national health
insurance (NHI) scheme, while the remit of local government covered environmental
health, isolation and general hospitals and a wide range of personal services addressing
tuberculosis, venereal diseases, mental illness, andmaternity and child welfare. Finally, the
private sector provided nursing homes and GP attendance at commercial rates.1 Within
each area there were tendencies towards independent rather than co-operative working.
Voluntary hospitals often lacked any mechanism for conferring with neighbouring institu-
tions and the competitive logic of fund-raising enforced an individualistic ethic.2 In the
public sector health responsibilities were dispersed across various agencies: local authority
health committees, advised by the county or borough Medical Officer of Health (MOH),
oversaw sanitation, hospitals and personal health services; education committees were
responsible for the School Medical Service (SMS), whose remit was the compulsory
medical inspection and treatment of elementary schoolchildren;3 the Poor Law provided
institutional care either in workhouses or separate infirmaries, although after the 1929
Local Government Act the boards of guardians were broken up; their powers were then
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transferred to the public assistance committees of local authorities, however these
remained distinct from health committees. GP services accessed through the state NHI
system were overseen by local insurance committees separate from local government.
Private practice co-existed with NHI and doctors tended to prioritize fee-paying rather than
panel patients.4
A concern to rationalize this situation ran through policy documents from 1900, starting
with the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission (1909), which sought ‘‘unity of
administration’’ to replace ‘‘wasteful and demoralising overlapping’’.5 The Dawson Report
of 1920 responded to its remit from government to consider ‘‘the systematical provision of
. . . medical and allied services’’, by proposing a scheme for primary health centres
affiliated to secondary centres, which in turn were attached to teaching hospitals.6 The
Cave Committee of 1921 also attacked the ‘‘lack of organisation and co-operation among
the voluntary hospitals’’, recommending local committees which would liaise with the
Poor Law infirmaries to relieve waiting lists.7 Co-ordination within the public sector was
central to the Local Government Act which sought to bring erstwhile Poor Law medical
facilities under the control of health committees, while Section 13 of the Act called for joint
voluntary/municipal hospital committees, giving statutory sanction to the collaboration
which had failed to occur spontaneously. Shortly afterwards the non-governmental Sankey
Report (1937) proposed regional co-ordination of voluntary hospitals ‘‘to bring their
services into harmonious relationship’’ through joint fund-raising and planning.8
Despite all this exhortation, the prevailing wisdom at the outset of debates about creating
a national health service was that little progress had been made. The PEP report (1937)
described Britain’s health services as ‘‘a mass of separate expedients . . . a bewildering
variety of agencies, official and unofficial . . . created during the past two or three gen-
erations’’, whose ‘‘general co-ordination . . . is still fragmentary’’.9 The Cave and Sankey
recommendations had not been met and the wartime hospital surveys of the Nuffield
Provincial Hospitals Trust concluded bluntly: ‘‘there is no hospital system now’’.10
And the 1944 White Paper on the planned National Health Service (NHS), commenced
with the observation that:
Many services are rendered by local authorities and others in special clinics and similar
organisations . . . These are, for the most part, thoroughly good in themselves . . . But, owing to the
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way in which they have grown up piecemeal at different stages of history and under different
statutory powers, they are usually conducted as quite separate and independent services. . . .
[T]here has to be somewhere a new responsibility to relate them, if a service for health is to be
given in future which will be not only comprehensive and reliable but also easy to obtain.11
Two questions arise from this. Why did the concern with an integrated service emerge,
and why could this not be achieved within the mixed economy of inter-war medicine?
Perhaps the most compelling theoretical framework for the impetus to co-ordination is that
which foregrounds the impact of medical science. The period saw the advance of expertise
closely linked to academic medicine, for example specialization in fields such as eyes,
orthopaedics, skin, ear, nose and throat, facilities for laboratory analysis, departments of
public health medicine and so on. Given the tendency for geographical concentration of
such expertise in large university towns it was in the interests of both practitioners and
public to ensure that an area’s health services worked together to establish referral mechan-
isms and rationalize patient flows to appropriate institutions: ‘‘hierarchical regionalism’’ in
Fox’s phrase.12 Case studies of towns such as Sheffield, Manchester, Glasgow and
Aberdeen have amplified this, identifying influential networks of members of public health
departments, voluntary hospitals and medical schools who advanced integration through
joint hospital committees.13 Work on individual cities and particular services has illu-
strated the joint activities of local government and voluntary sector in developing specialist
work: contracting of laboratory and maternity services and of VD and infant welfare
clinics, providing consultants in municipal hospitals, funding charities for the welfare
of the blind and so on.14 A complementary reading stresses also the influence of the
business model on health service organization.15 This period saw the advance of vertical
integration of the firm, as mergers achieved economies of scale and fostered research and
development. A ‘‘rationalization’’ movement championed ‘‘scientific management’’, the
school of thought derived from Taylorism, which encouraged systematic planning, man-
agerial restructuring and the elimination of wasteful practices.16 Ernest Bevin summarized
the implications thus: ‘‘In industry today . . .we are asked to rationalize. I would like to see
the benefits of rationalization applied to the treatment of disease’’.17 Finally, a cross-party
enthusiasm for economic planning was discernible in the ideologically diverse advocacy
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c.1780–1930, Aldershot, Ashgate 2004, pp. 381–92,
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London, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1996, pp. 177–91,
208–9, 214–23, 252–6.
15S Sturdy and R Cooter, ‘Science, scientific
management, and the transformation of medicine in
Britain c.1870–1950’, Hist. Sci., 1998, 36: 421–66,
pp. 425–30.
16L Hannah, The rise of the corporate economy,
London, Methuen, 1976, pp. 123–30, 139–40.
17Hospital Saving Association, Annual report,
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groups which emerged in the 1930s, whether inspired by the Soviet command economy, or
by the desire to avert recession.18
However the dynamic of integration cannot be understood solely as a value-neutral
expression of technocratic advance. Instead the banner of ‘‘co-ordination’’ was raised by
different interest groups seeking to advance their positions. Rather than regarding the NHS
as the product of a consensus for reorganization, it may also be understood as the outcome
of struggle which pitched the labour movement and progressive civil servants against the
medical establishment.19 Resistance to change was expressed in the British Medical
Association’s (BMA) hostility to doctors coming under the authority of local government,
and also by the limited advance of co-operative working between municipal and voluntary
hospitals, while the left’s growing enthusiasm for a state medical service, particularly as
articulated by the Socialist Medical Association, represented a more radical vision.20 In
this reading ‘‘co-ordination’’ to achieve a comprehensive and universal service was not just
more efficient, it was profoundly ideological.
A Case Study: The Gloucestershire Extension of Medical Services Scheme
Thus far consideration of these issues has been at the level of national policy discourse,
supported by a limited number of urban case studies. By contrast, the subject of this article
is an initiative directed at the health of the rural population. This was a local experiment in
service organization begun by Gloucestershire County Council in 1920, which sought in a
novel way to integrate the work of GPs, the tax-funded public health services and the
voluntary hospitals. Known as the Gloucestershire Extension of Medical Services Scheme
(GEMSS), it was the brainchild of the County MOH, John Middleton Martin, and its
innovative feature was the provision of ‘‘out-stations’’ in the rural parts of the county
(Figure 1). These were small-scale health centres, either purpose built or situated in
existing cottage hospitals, Poor Law institutions or tuberculosis dispensaries, and staffed
by GPs paid on a contractual basis. Gloucestershire was divided into administrative areas
(Bristol, Gloucester and Cheltenham), each with its general hospital, to which the out-
stations were affiliated for patient referrals, and with its specialist institutions such as
tuberculosis sanatoria.
The GEMSS differed from other municipal health services in several ways. First, it
utilized independent GPs and consultants rather than local government medical officers.
Second, its out-stations were all-purpose treatment centres, as opposed to clinics targeted
at a particular population or ailment. Third, it imposed a referral network upon existing
institutions—public and voluntary—to fulfil public health duties, rather than building
a separate municipal network. Finally, it was managed, at least at its inception, by
18D Ritschel, The politics of planning: the debate
on economic planning in Britain in the 1930s, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1997.
19C Webster, ‘Conflict and consensus: explaining
the British Health Service’, Twentieth Century Br.
Hist., 1990, 1 (2): 115–51.
20FHonigsbaum,The division in Britishmedicine:
a history of the separation of general practice from
hospital care, 1911–1968, London,KoganPage, 1979,
ch.19; M Gorsky and J Mohan, ‘London’s voluntary
hospitals in the inter-war period: growth,
transformation or crisis?’, Nonprofit and Voluntary
Sector Quarterly, 2001, 30 (2): 247–75, pp. 264–7; J
Stewart, ‘The battle for health’: a political history of
the Socialist Medical Association, 1930–51,
Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999.
494
Martin Gorsky
Figure 1: The scheme depicted as a referral network. (Source: Gloucestershire Archives, CM/R6,
J Middleton Martin, Gloucestershire Scheme for the Extension of Medical Services (Gloucester,
1920); reproduced by kind permission of Gloucestershire Archives.)
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a committee consisting of local authority and voluntary hospital representatives.21 Here,
apparently, was a concrete expression of the reformers’ vision of service co-ordination,
both between the municipal, private and voluntary sectors, and within the municipal sector,
which proved so elusive nationally.
Indeed, the scheme was recognized both nationally and internationally, periodically
attracting praise as a template that might be more widely applied. The Dawson Report
reproduced a map of one of its regions (Figure 2), and argued that its own proposals for the
integration of ‘‘primary’’ and ‘‘secondary’’ care ‘‘may be usefully illustrated by taking the
actual example of Gloucestershire’’.22 Arthur Newsholme’s Milbank-sponsored study of
European health systems accorded Gloucestershire a full chapter, suggesting that the
scheme ‘‘furnishes valuable indications for other communities’’.23 When the Ministry
of Health conducted its public health surveys of local government in the early 1930s it
too lauded the GEMSS’s innovatory features, observing that it ‘‘deserves to be considered
as a serious contribution to the theory and practice of public health in rural counties’’.24
There was also American interest, in the visit of Professor Winslow of Yale University to
study the out-stations, and the GEMSS’s inclusion in a major study of British health
insurance.25 The PEP report also detailed the arrangements, arguing that it demonstrated
how ‘‘to bridge the gulf between official and unofficial health services which is so frequent
and so unsatisfactory a feature of the present situation’’.26 This then was an arrangement
with more than just local interest, though as yet one which has attracted only passing
mention from historians.27
The aim of this article is to treat the GEMSS as a case study which can illuminate two
key questions about inter-war health services. First, by exploring the origin of the scheme,
it seeks to identify the factors tending towards the regional co-ordination of inter-war
health services. Second, in showing why the scheme remained of local and indeed dimin-
ishing significance, it will offer insight into the forces acting against the development of an
organized health system based on a mixed economy, prior to the more far-reaching reforms
of 1946–8. The principal methodology is a qualitative study of administrative documents
generated by various committees of Gloucestershire County Council, along with the annual
21Gloucestershire County Council, Annual report
of the Medical Officer of Health, 1936 (hereafter GCC
MOH), Gloucester, 1937, p. 40.
22Dawson Report, op. cit., note 6 above, p. 7.
23A Newsholme, International studies on the
relation between the private and official practice of
medicine, 3 vols, London,Allen&Unwin, 1931–1932,
vol. 3, ch. 16, p. 282; Newsholme was MOH for
Brighton (1888–1908), then Medical Officer to the
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advocate of comprehensive municipal medical
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Press, 1997, p. 214.
24NA:PRO MH66/90, A C Parsons,
‘AdministrativeCountyofGloucestershire: report on a
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25 Ibid., p. 90; D Orr and J Orr, Health insurance
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Macmillan, 1938, pp. 140–2. Charles-Edward Amory
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Organisation. See A J Viseltear, ‘C.-E. A. Winslow:
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George Rosen, Folkestone, Dawson Science
History Publications, 1979, pp. 205–28; I V Hiscock,
‘Charles-Edward Amory Winslow, February 4,
1877–January 8, 1957’, J. Bacteriol., 1957, 73 (3):
pp. 295–6.
26PEP, Report, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 165, 256,
367–8, quote on p. 398.
27Fox, op. cit., note 12 above, p. 60.
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Figure 2: The scheme depicted in the Dawson Report. (Source: Consultative Council onMedical and
Allied Services, Interim report on the future provision of medical and allied services, Cmd. 693,
London, HMSO, 1920.)
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reports and publications of the Gloucestershire MOH. The reports also provide statistical
details of the GEMSS which are used in conjunction with local tax data to survey its
utilization and finances. Official responses to the GEMSS have been traced through
consideration of the Dawson Report, of the Ministry of Health survey reports and corre-
spondence, and the other documents noted above.
The Gloucestershire Extension of Medical Services Scheme: A History
Origin and Early Phase, 1918–1923
The Gloucestershire scheme had its formal inception in the county council’s plans for
the medical care of discharged servicemen. The idea of out-stations affiliated to general
hospitals was mooted in April 1918, the context being a discussion of post-war treatment of
disabled veterans prompted by the Ministry of Pensions.28 In early 1919 Middleton Martin
secured approval from the Gloucestershire branch of the British Medical Association
(BMA) and from one of the key voluntary hospitals, the Cheltenham General; the county
council adopted the scheme in July 1919.29 A board of management, consisting of repre-
sentatives of the local authority, the voluntary hospitals and the Red Cross, first met in
October to plan the regional structure and submit formal proposals to the Ministry of
Health; these were approved, initially for one year, in April 1920, at which point the
scheme began.30
What were its main features at the time of conception? Middleton Martin’s plan was to
open out-stations throughout the county which would act as ‘‘a series of ‘forward’ out-
patient departments for each hospital’’.31 The ultimate goal was to provide fifty-six out-
stations to cover the entire county: one within every three square miles.32 They were to be
staffed by local medical practitioners who would attend at given times in the week, aided
by district nurses, who would provide intermediate treatment in the doctor’s absence.
Specialist treatment would be delivered by consultants from the affiliated general hospi-
tals, who would periodically visit out-stations to treat patients grouped according to a
particular complaint. Payment for the doctors and nurses was at hourly rates, and the
consultancy work contracted through a fixed annual sum paid to the designated hospitals.33
In addition to the management board, a medical advisory committee was organized, with
GP, BMA and voluntary hospital representatives. This resolved questions over which
doctors should serve at the out-stations and organized rotas where there was competition,
so all shared in the benefits.34
With respect to finance, running costs were initially to be divided between the public
health, education, and maternity and child welfare (MCW) committees of the council, and
the local war pensions committee. A significant proportion of this would come not from the
rates alone but from the Treasury grants which supported local authority tuberculosis,
28 J MiddletonMartin,Gloucestershire scheme for
the extension of medical services, Gloucester, 1920,
pp. 4, 6.
29 Ibid., p. 6.
30Gloucestershire Archives (hereafter GA), CM/
M/16/1 ‘Extension of Medical Services Board of
Management Minute Book’ (hereafter GEMSS MB),
25 Oct. 1919, 24 April 1920.
31 ‘Extension of institutional medical services’,
Br. med. J., 22 Feb. 1919, i: 218–19, p. 218.
32 J Middleton Martin, ‘The problem of medical
services’, Contemp. Rev., 1922: 364–72, on p. 369;
Parsons, op. cit., note 24 above, p. 94.
33Middleton Martin, ibid., p. 371.
34GA, CJ/M/16/1 GEMSS MB, 14 July 1920;
NA:PRO MH/66/ 91 ‘Appendix 6’, pp. 3, 5.
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MCW and VD work. It was expected that the Exchequer would also finance much of
the capital cost of the out-stations, subject to Ministry of Health approval. This was
confidently anticipated, especially since the Red Cross had offered to grant £7,000 towards
building costs if this was matched by government, leaving the council to find only £2,000
itself.35
The graphic (Figure 1) which accompanied a pamphlet written by Middleton Martin
illustrates the expected chain relationship between out-stations, general hospitals and other
specialist hospitals and services.36 The over-arching goal was to knit together the different
health providers—voluntary, public and private—in a coherent hierarchical network for
referrals and treatment. Health services would therefore reach groups in rural areas where
distance, or, for children, parental commitments, meant that even where early diagnosis
was made, follow-up treatment was lacking. Middleton Martin also stressed that this
framework could be easily adapted to further co-ordination of existing services. In parti-
cular, he anticipated that the scope of NHI would be widened, and that the scheme’s
formalized referral system would replace the existing ad hoc arrangements, which relied
upon the individual panel doctor’s expertise and connections. In addition, he envisaged the
removal from the Poor Law of the sick and infirm, who would also come under the
scheme.37 Finally, he argued that the incipient hospital and medical insurance schemes
for the middle class could also ‘‘readily be grafted on’’ to the GEMSS.38
The Intellectual Origins of the GEMSS
Where did the idea for the GEMSS come from? Given their apparently simultaneous
gestation, it might be supposed that the Dawson Report provided the inspiration. However,
according to Middleton Martin, his initiative predated Dawson’s first public discussion of
primary and secondary health centres. This was propounded in the Cavendish lectures of
July 1918, three months after initial proposals in Gloucestershire.39 The Gloucestershire
MOH subsequently corresponded with Dawson, whose biographer asserts that his support
was instrumental in gaining approval for the scheme from the Ministry of Health, and in
securing a pledge of financial aid from the Red Cross and the Order of St John.40 Dawson’s
significance may be overdrawn, since a prominent manager of GEMSS, Francis
Colchester-Wemyss, was also a member of the Joint War Committee of the Red
Cross.41 After publication of the Report, Middleton Martin initially distanced himself
from Dawson’s proposals when he perceived a negative response from the profession.
The GEMSS out-stations, he stressed, were much more modest affairs than the primary
35GA, CM/M/16/1/ GEMSS MB, 21 June 1919.
36Middleton Martin, Gloucestershire scheme,
op. cit., note 28 above, p. 7.
37GCC MOH 1924, p. 33.
38Middleton Martin, ‘The problem of medical
services’, op. cit., note 32 above, p. 369; idem, ‘The
medical profession and rate-provided hospitals’, Br.
med. J., 6 Aug. 1921, ii: 191–2.
39Middleton Martin, Gloucestershire scheme, op.
cit, note 28 above, p. 6; Br. med. J., 1918, ii: 23–6,
56–9; intriguinglyDawson andMiddletonMartin both
trained at University College London, though Dawson
was six years the elder: C Webster, ‘The
metamorphosis of Dawson of Penn’, in Dorothy Porter
and Roy Porter (eds), Doctors, politics and society:
historical essays, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1993,
pp. 212–28.
40FWatson,Dawson of Penn, London, Chatto and
Windus, 1950, pp. 155–6.
41Who was who 1951–60, London, Adam &
Charles Black, 1967, p. 227.
499
The Gloucestershire Extension of Medical Services Scheme
centres proposed by Dawson, which conjured alarming images of salaried doctors in state
polyclinics.42 However, he invoked Dawson in his support when addressing the BMA’s
Medical Sociology Section in 1921: the health services, he said, were ‘‘truly . . . at the
parting of the ways’’, and his scheme demonstrated how ‘‘to build up a constructive policy
for the future’’.43 Although he retained this rhetoric in later reviews of the scheme, he
subsequently abandoned reference to Dawson.44 The evidence therefore suggests the
Gloucestershire scheme was conceived independently of Dawson.
Despite the absence of direct influence, might Middleton Martin’s thinking, like Daw-
son’s, have been shaped by his wartime experiences?45 Certainly the proximate cause of
the GEMSS’s foundation was the anticipated need of the local war pensions committee.
Such committees were empowered to provide appropriate care for veterans, with costs met
by the Ministry of Pensions, and after the closure of the military hospitals in 1918 it was
necessary to fund orthopaedic hospitals linked to out-patient facilities.46 Wartime
structures also provided the model for the GEMSS’s Medical Advisory Committee,
whose constitutional procedures copied those of the Cheltenham War Hospital’s advisory
committee.47 In addition, the description of the out-stations as ‘‘ ‘forward’ out-patient
departments for each hospital’’ is evocative of military language.48 That said, Middleton
Martin, unlike Dawson, had remained on the home front, and reference to military med-
icine does not feature in any of the justifications proffered for his experiment.
Instead he presented the GEMSS essentially as a rational solution to the practical
problems of meeting statutory health obligations in a rural locale.49 The choice, he
asserted, was twofold. Either the council could employ specialist health officers and
develop dedicated institutions to treat particular diseases or groups of patients, or it
could build a service around private practitioners and existing institutions. The former
method was appropriate in the county boroughs, but the counties had the problem of
providing access to specialist care for patients in rural areas, for whom the distances
involved in reaching municipal dispensaries and institutions were prohibitive. The archi-
pelago of out-stations therefore promised to bring state medicine within easy proximity
of all.
Did this apparently technocratic solution have an ideological foundation? Middleton
Martin (Figure 3) certainly appears to have been a politically mainstream thinker. Born in
Exeter in 1870 he took a first in natural sciences at Peterhouse, Cambridge, and gained his
medical qualifications in London at University College Hospital. His career began as
resident at Brighton’s Hospital for Women, and he then studied for his Diploma in Public
Health (1899) and MD (1903).50 His first public appointment (1901) was as MOH to the
urban and rural district councils of Stroud and Nailsworth, areas of small-town textile
42 ‘Correspondence’, Br. med. J., 27 Nov. 1920, ii:
842; 11 Dec. 1920, p. 916; 18 Dec. 1920, p. 952;
Honigsbaum, op. cit., note 20 above, pp. 64–133.
43Br. med. J., 6 Aug. 1921, ii: 191–2, on p. 191.
44GCC MOH, passim.
45Webster, op. cit., note 39 above, pp. 213–16;
Sturdy and Cooter, op. cit., note 15 above, pp. 433–4.
46Ministry of Pensions, First annual report of the
Minister of Pensions to 31st March 1918, London,
HMSO, 1919, pp. 4–11, 30–1, 36–7; Second annual
report of the Minister of Pensions from 31st March
1918 to 31st May 1919, London, HMSO, 1920,
pp. 26–7.
47Newsholme, op. cit., note 23 above, pp. 311–12.
48 ‘Extension of institutionalmedical services’,Br.
med. J., 22 Feb. 1919, i: 218.
49Middleton Martin, ‘The problem of medical
services’, op. cit., note 32 above, pp. 367–8.
50The Medical Directory 1934, London, J & A
Churchill, 1934, p. 975.
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industry and rural Cotswold parishes. He then became county MOH in 1903. After early
research on the health of schoolchildren, he began to publish epidemiological studies,
utilizing the relatively novel technique of correlating adjusted death rates from various
diseases with environmental and economic variables.51 He was not afraid to adopt a
maverick position on tuberculosis policy, arguing against the use of sanatoria on the
grounds that the rate of decline in TB mortality was unrelated to trends in institutionaliza-
tion. Instead his remedy was to improve early diagnosis, milk safety and nutrition to
strengthen resistance; the Ministry of Health suspected that he used sanatorium admissions
principally as a means of feeding underweight children.52 All this indicates that a first-hand
experience of the needs of the rural poor underpinned the GEMSS project.
51 J Middleton Martin, ‘An analysis of
Gloucestershire statistics, 1901–10’, Proceedings of
the Royal Society of Medicine, Section of
Epidemiology and State Medicine, 1915–16, 9: 1–32;
idem, ‘Scarlet fever outbreak at Stroud due to milk’,
Public Health, Dec. 1901, 14: 138–42; idem, ‘Schools
and infectious disease’, Public Health, July 1902, 14:
608–11; idem, ‘An inquiry into the distribution of
certain diseases (cancer, phthisis, and pneumonia) on
the western slopes of the Cotteswold Hills’, Public
Health, Oct. 1904, 17: 4–31; Eyler, op. cit., note 23
above, pp. 27–41.
52 J Middleton Martin, ‘Tuberculosis—dogmas
and doubts of sixty years’, Br. med. J., Feb.
1939, i: 204–9; Parsons, op. cit., note 24 above,
pp. 71–3.
Figure3: JohnMiddletonMartin. (Source:BritishMedical Journal, 13 Jan. 1940, i: 74, photographby
Elliot and Fry Ltd, reproduced with permission from the BMJ Publishing Group.)
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Glimpses of his political perspective appear in his post-war publications on the orga-
nization of health services. He did not favour a more extensive state medical service, and
was explicitly conservative in his preference for structures built around existing voluntary
and private provision; one article invoked Polonius’s advice to his son to make this point:
‘‘The friends thou hast and their adoption tried, grapple them to thy soul with hoops of
steel’’.53 He was an active member of the local BMA, and also sat on several of its national
bodies, including the Private Practice Committee.54 The problem of reconciling the inter-
ests of private practice and an expanding state medical sector was therefore a central
concern. Indeed his thinking at the inception of the GEMSS may have been shaped by a
salient national debate of 1917–18, over plans to extend the School Medical Service to
include children in nursery and secondary schools. The BMA had objected that this
foreshadowed the creation of a local authority medical service which would undermine
private practice; hence the eventual legislation limited the right of local government to
establish domiciliary services to undertake SMS work, and urged contracting from GPs
instead.55 The out-stations concept, therefore, not only solved problems of rural isolation,
but also systematized the co-existence of state and private medicine at a time when this
relationship was controversial.
However, the real intellectual antecedents of the plan probably lay with the Majority and
Minority Reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws (1909). The Commission
embodied a new consensus over the need to reform Poor Law medicine, arising from the
growing acceptance that disease was a cause of poverty, and that the stigmatizing and
deterrent aspects of the Poor Law were harmful.56 Alternative remedies were proposed.
The Minority Report strongly advocated the break-up of the Poor Law and the removal of
its medical functions to council public health committees, providing services to which all
would be entitled.57 Such a major advance of state medicine was rejected by the Majority
Report, which recommended instead that medical care for the poor should remain with the
remit of public assistance committees (who would replace boards of guardians). But,
recognizing the need to strengthen the service, it called for a system of provident dis-
pensaries which would serve both ordinary subscribers and Poor Law applicants, and be the
nexus of integration with voluntary medical institution and private practice.58
Middleton Martin’s proposals straddled these two positions. He explicitly cited
the Majority Report’s aspiration that its dispensary proposals would lead to the
replacement of Poor Law medical officers by contracting from local
53Middleton Martin, ‘The problem of medical
services’, op. cit., note 32 above, p. 372.
54 ‘Obituary’, Lancet, 20 Jan. 1940, i: 149;
‘Obituary’, Br. med. J., 13 Jan. 1940, i: 74.
55Harris, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 81–2.
56 JMiddletonMartin, ‘Poor law reform and public
health’, Br. med. J., 28 Aug. 1926, ii: 376–80, on
pp. 378–9; Report of the Royal Commission on the
Poor Laws and Relief of Distress (hereafter Majority
Report), 5 vols, Cd. 4499, 1909, vol. 1,
pp. 371–2, 380–1.
57Webb and Webb (eds), op. cit., note 5 above,
pp. 585–7; though authored by Beatrice Webb, these
recommendations were informed by Arthur
Newsholme, whose pioneering organizational work as
MOH for Brighton must have been familiar to
Middleton Martin from his contemporaneous stint in
the city, Eyler, op. cit., note 23 above, pp. 165,
195–219;AMMcBriar,AnEdwardianmixed doubles,
the Bosanquets versus the Webbs, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1987, pp. 231–6, 297–8.
58Majority Report, pp. 384–8; S Sturdy,
‘Alternative publics: the development of government
policy on personal health care, 1905–11’, in S Sturdy
(ed.), Medicine, health and the public sphere in
Britain, 1600–2000, London, Routledge, 2002,
pp. 241–59.
502
Martin Gorsky
practitioners.59 However his writings also invoke a sense of inexorable progress towards a
health service which no longer discriminated against Poor Law patients. He identified a
‘‘gradual change in the social outlook, progressing with extraordinary rapidity’’ and a
‘‘general agreement . . . that the responsibility for the care of the poor should now be spread
over a much wider area’’.60 His conception of an escalating pace of change was expressed
through narrative accounts of the Poor Law and public health statutes issued since the
sixteenth century, viewed as ‘‘natural lines of progress’’ towards non-discriminatory public
medical care.61 In this ‘‘gradual evolution of the problem of the care of the necessitous . . .
the next stage would naturally be to provide care and treatment . . . avoiding the class
distinction which is rightly regarded as very unfortunate’’.62 To some extent social justice
informed this thought, in the conviction that the divisiveness of the Poor Law and its
accompanying stigma were anachronistic, and in the concern to provide rural dwellers with
the ‘‘opportunities for which all pay’’.63 However, rather than foreshadowing the expansive
state medical service advocated by elements of the inter-war left—the health centre model
of the Socialist Medical Association, for example—it looked back to New Liberalism, with
its faith in organizational improvement to combat structural causes of social need.64
The Functioning of the Scheme 1920–48
Middleton Martin’s bold plans were thwarted almost immediately. The Ministry of
Health delayed its deliberations on the scheme, and approved the initial year only in
early 1920, following lobbying by local MPs and by W F Hicks Beach, chair of both
the county’s public health committee and of the GEMSS, who also enlisted the support of
George Newman, the Chief Medical Officer.65 This allowed an attenuated version of the
scheme to commence, based on only eight out-stations. Then, in November 1921 the
Ministry decided that it could not sanction further expansion. Nationally, the context
was the post-war curb on expenditure for social reform, which has been variously
explained in terms of bureaucratic failings, Conservative hostility and Treasury pressure.66
Further lobbying on behalf of the GEMSS ensued, but to no avail. By May 1922 the
Ministry had confirmed its decision and the matching Red Cross funds were withdrawn.67
This financial blow coincided with a weakening of local support. One casualty was the plan
for a comprehensive arrangement with the University of Bristol for pathological and
bacteriological analysis, to be available for all practitioners. The county council voted
59Majority Report, pp. 358–9; Middleton Martin,
‘Poor Law reform’, op. cit., note 56 above, pp. 378–9.
60Middleton Martin, ibid., p. 377.
61Middleton Martin, ‘The problem of medical
services’, op. cit., note 32 above, pp. 364–7; idem,
‘Poor Law reform’, op. cit., note 56 above, pp. 376–8.
62Middleton Martin, ‘Poor Law reform’, op. cit.,
note 56 above, p. 380.
63 J Middleton Martin, ‘The medical profession
and rate-provided hospitals’, Br. med. J., 6 Aug. 1921,
ii: 191–2, on p. 191.
64Stewart, op. cit., note 20 above; J Harris,Private
lives, public spirit: Britain 1870–1914, Oxford
University Press, 1993; Harmondsworth, Penguin,
1994, pp. 237–41.
65GA, CM/M/16/1 GEMSS MB, 20 Dec. 1919,
27 March 1920, 24 April 1920.
66BHarris, The origins of the Britishwelfare state:
society, state and socialwelfare in EnglandandWales,
1800–1945, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004,
pp. 180–1.
67GA, CM/M/16/1 GEMSS MB, 10 Oct. 1921, 1
May 1922; CM/M1/4 ‘Public Health and Housing
Committee’, 26 Nov. 1921.
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instead to continue with its existing, and considerably cheaper, practice of limiting labora-
tory contracting to the council’s own analytical requirements for specific diseases.68 Next
it undermined Middleton Martin’s own position, removing the £250 supplement to his
annual salary for duties as the GEMSS’s Executive Medical Officer.69
Worse was to follow when a hostile survey from the Board of Education criticized the
administration of the scheme.70 The Board was the government department which oversaw
the School Medical Service, and its sanction was required for the county education
committee’s expenditure on the GEMSS.71 Although the correspondence with the
Board appears not to have survived, committee discussions reveal that its concern was
with the GEMSS’s costs, which had in practice fallen most heavily upon the education
committee.72 Under the initial financing proposals, education was to provide one-third of
the cost, commensurate with the anticipated proportion of the GEMSS’s work which would
be devoted to schoolchildren.73 In practice though, the education budget met 62 per cent of
the cost in the first year (see Figure 6 below), rising to 77 per cent in the financial year
1922–23.74 The Board therefore demanded a restructuring of the management committee
to allow the education committee nine of the eighteen seats, with the medical advisory
committee (the doctors) reduced to consultative status.75 In addition to the reduction in
Middleton Martin’s salary, cuts were then made to consultants’ fees and clerical support.76
In sum, the Ministry of Health’s failure to back the scheme as it was originally conceived
meant that it was a considerably scaled down version that was put into operation.
Following this inauspicious start, how did the scheme develop?Given the lack of capital
the planned network of out-stations was drastically cut back and, despite gradual devel-
opment, never reached the ‘‘ideal’’ coverage originally envisaged. In 1921, the first year for
which statistical records appear in the annual report of Gloucestershire’s MOH, eight out-
stations were operational, and 911 attendances at these were recorded. By 1930 sixteen
were in use, with just over 16,000 attendances, and by the time of Middleton Martin’s
retirement in 1937, the number had risen to eighteen.77 A map produced in 1932 shows
seventeen operational out-stations, mostly in cottage hospitals but with a few purpose built
in isolated districts (Bourton-on-the-Water, Chipping Campden).78 The standard design
included waiting, consulting and dressing rooms, and lavatories; equipment was limited to
cabinets for medicines and filing, weighing machines and eye test posters.79 In the mid-
1930s some additional coverage was achieved by subsidiary out-stations, based in a room
in the house of the district nurse.80 Two types of session were run. First, there were regular
68GA, CM/M/16/1 GEMSSMB, 21 June 1920, 11
Dec. 1920, 12 March 1921; GCC MOH 1936,
Gloucester, 1937, p. 56.
69GA, CM/M/16/1 GEMSS MB, 26 Nov. 1921,
24 June 1922.
70GA, CM/M/16/1 GEMSS MB, 13
Oct. 1922.
71Gloucestershire County Council report of the
Education Committee for 1922–23 (hereafter GCC
EC), p. 32.
72GA, CM/1 Gloucestershire Education
Committee, signed copies of Minutes, May 1921 to
March 1923, inclusive, vol. lxv, 25 Nov. 1922.
73GCC EC, 1921–22, p. 33.
74Gloucestershire County Council, Abstract of
accounts, 1921–22, 1922–23 (hereafter GCC
Abstract).
75GA, CJ/M/8/1 GEMSS MB, 21 April 1923;
CM/M1/4, ‘Public Health and Housing Committee’,
24 March 1923; CC/MS Gloucestershire County
Council, minutes of proceeding, xxxv, 10th April, 1923
to 18th February 1924, 9 July 1923.
76GA, CJ/M/8/1 GEMSS MB, 21 April, 7 July,
5 Aug. 1923.
77GCC MOH, 1921, 1930, 1936.
78Parsons, op. cit., note 24 above, insert after p. 93.
79NA:PRO MH/66/ 91, ‘Appendix 6’, p. 7.
80 Ibid., p. 9; GCC MOH 1933, p. 28.
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weekly openings at which the medical officer and district nurse examined and treated
patients for minor ailments, typically referrals from the nurse or the School Medical
Service. Second, hospital consultants attended for intermediate sessions to treat patients
for ophthalmic, ENT, orthopaedic and tuberculosis complaints and rheumatic heart dis-
ease; surgical work performed at the out-stations was principally tonsils and adenoids
operations.81 Two orthopaedic nurses also visited the stations as necessary to offer treat-
ment such as massage, and oversee more routine work conducted by district nurses.82
Figure 4 shows the main categories of cases treated. This demonstrates that the original
aim of addressing a broad clientele ranging from war veterans to Poor Law patients was
never fulfilled. Instead the main activity from the outset was dealing with schoolchildren.
The fundamental achievement of the GEMSS was therefore the provision of a systematic
referral system which ensured that the diagnostic work of school medical inspections was
followed up by treatment, a situation which did not obtain in many areas.83 Tuberculosis
work remained a fairly minor aspect of the scheme, and continued to be dealt with
principally through the county’s public health administration, overseen by the deputy
MOH.84 In practice the scheme supplemented existing machinery by ensuring that country
patients without easy access to urban dispensaries were seen regularly by the TB Officer.85
The same was true of maternity and child welfare work, where doctors acting as out-station
medical officers were often also contracted by the MCW committee to run ante-natal and
infant welfare clinics in isolated areas.86 Referrals were made where necessary to voluntary
hospital consultants who made home visits in cases of puerperal pyrexia and difficult
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Figure 4: Categories of cases treated under the Gloucestershire Extension of Medical Services
Scheme, 1921–1936.
81NA:PRO MH/66/ 91, ‘Appendix 6’, pp. 10–11.
82 Ibid., p. 5; GCC MOH 1933, p. 32.
83Harris, The health of the schoolchild, op. cit.,
note 3 above, pp. 110–13.
84U.K. Local Government Financial Statistics,
1935–36.
85Parsons, op. cit., note 24 above, p. 91.
86 Ibid., p. 96.
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obstetrical cases, in 1932 five out-stations were equipped for dental work for expectant and
nursing mothers.87 Finally, venereal disease work was a key area of growth in the 1930s,
with some out-stations used as ‘‘VD sub-centres’’ at which the medical officer gave drug
treatment, supervised by a Bristol VD specialist.88 This category of case was not counted in
the annual statistics, so presumably numbers were small.
Figure 5 presents the main components of expenditure. About half of the costs went on
medical personnel, to GPs for acting as out-station officers and to hospital consultants for
attendances and surgical procedures. The ‘‘other items’’ category is not defined in the
source material (the MOH annual reports) but presumably covers the rental costs for the
out-stations, the maintenance fees of patients referred to hospital, and miscellanea such as
clerical assistance and X-ray costs.89 Like the staff costs, these increased at a fairly stable
rate as the activities of the scheme and the number of out-stations grew. The only com-
ponent that markedly increased its share of spending was orthopaedics, which by 1931
accounted for about one-third of total expenditure. Prior to 1922 the only orthopaedic work
done at public expense addressed ‘‘defects’’ due to tuberculosis, so this was a key innova-
tion.90 In addition to the two nurses noted above, orthopaedic cases were grouped quarterly
for examination at the out-stations and general hospital clinics, and where necessary home
visits were organized following referrals by district nurses.91 Their work focused
87NA:PROMH/66/ 91, ‘Appendix 6’, p. 14; GCC
MOH 1932, p. 32.
88NA:PRO MH/66/92, L Harrison,
‘Gloucestershire VD Scheme’, 9 July 1934.
89NA:PRO MH/66/ 91, ‘Appendix 6’, p. 4.
90GCCMOH1932, p. 32; thiswas a national trend,
see Harris, Health of the schoolchild, op. cit., note 3
above, pp. 110–11.
91GCC MOH 1932, p. 31.
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particularly on diseases of the foot (flat feet, club feet, claw feet), rickets (knock knees, bow
legs), infantile paralysis and scoliosis.92 Orthopaedics costs were divided fairly evenly
between the education and MCW committees, so again this was an aspect of the GEMSS’s
key function of advancing child health.93
Turning finally to the financing of the scheme, Figure 6 shows the composition of its
income (first y-axis, bars), which was drawn from four committees of the council.94 The
education committee had a dominant role, providing on average 75 per cent of annual costs
throughout the sequence. A growing proportion came from the MCW budget, illustrating
the increasing focus on the pre-school child alongside the SMS work. The VD committee
contributed only a minute sum after the first two years, and the amounts given by the TB
committee also quickly declined as the GEMSS’s tuberculosis work was predominantly
aimed at schoolchildren. Total expenditure on the GEMSS (second y-axis, lines) is also
shown, adjusted to constant prices to illustrate real trends; this is set against the total
expenditure on public health from the School Medical Service budget (GEMSS, medical
inspections, dental care). This shows, unsurprisingly, that the scope for the scheme’s
expansion was closely tied to the state of the education budget.
It is also important to stress that funding came from committees whose health work was
heavily subsidized by central government. Under the percentage grant arrangement which
obtained prior to 1930, MCW and TB work was supported at 50 per cent of approved
92GCC MOH 1934, p. 35.
93GA, CJ/M/8/7 GEMSS MB, 2 Dec. 1929.
94GCC, Abstract, passim; composition of income
was reported only for the years shown; from 1934–5
the GEMSS element was not disaggregated from the
total school medical service contribution to public
health.
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expenditure, and VD treatment at 75 per cent.95 After 1930 councils received a block grant
in support of rate and grant-borne expenditure, and, although this was not allocated to
specific services, it may be assumed that it too underwrote health spending.96 Local
education also received a Treasury grant, of at least 50 per cent, based on expenditure,
average attendance and rateable values; the national mean was 55 per cent, while in
Gloucestershire this averaged 60 per cent.97 It took the form of a block grant from
which SMS costs were paid, although up until 1918–19 there had been a specific medical
grant, which in its final year had covered 52 per cent of the school health budget.98 Thus,
although the precise proportion of the GEMSSwhich was indirectly financed by the state is
uncertain, it was at most only half funded from local rates. In part then its muted growth
was due to the unwillingness of council members to authorize spending which would place
any excess burden on the rates. To some extent this reflects the atmosphere of retrenchment
which characterized inter-war municipal health services.99 However, in comparative per-
spective Gloucestershire seems to have been ‘‘a frugal minded body where public health is
concerned’’; the Ministry of Health noted disapprovingly in 1932 that the proportion of
expenditure it committed to public health was lower than that of other southern agricultural
counties.100
Muted Growth in the 1930s and 1940s
These statistical indicators of the GEMSS’s performance confirm that, despite its
achievements, Middleton Martin’s vision was not fulfilled. Indeed the disappointments
which followed the withdrawal of Ministry of Health support were accompanied by others.
Public take-up was slow and initially capacity far exceeded demand.101 By 1922 the out-
stations attached to the Stroud, Gloucester and Cheltenham hospitals were closed.102 The
Ministry continued to be tight-fisted in its treatment, seeking to claw back the limited
grants which it had made between 1920 and 1922 by offsetting these against the Red Cross
grants.103 Growth was then restrained by financial retrenchment in the mid-1920s and the
early 1930s: for example, plans in the 1931–2 estimates to increase the number of out-
stations by seven were reduced to only two new buildings.104 The hoped for ‘‘grafting on’’
of NHI patients never occurred, and nor did the anticipated expansion of middle-class
provident insurance take place.
None the less, the GEMSS did act as a modest integrating force. Joint working with Poor
Law services progressed slightly, in the arrangement for Bristol surgeons to use Thornbury
institution for tonsils and adenoids operations, and the opening of an out-station in North-
leach Institution.105 The GEMSS also provided a channel for public funds to underpin
95H Finer, English local government, London,
Methuen, 1946, pp. 464–5.
96City and county of Bristol: epitome and general
statistics of the city accounts for the year ended 31st
March 1932, Bristol, 1932, pp. 6–7.
97Finer, op. cit., note 95 above, p. 462; Harris,
Health of the schoolchild, op. cit., note 3 above, p. 92.
98GCC, Abstract, 1918–19.
99Welshman, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 135, 176,
181, 258–9.
100Parsons, op. cit., note 24 above, pp. 5, 8; the
comparison was made with Cornwall, Shropshire,
Berkshire, West Sussex, Bedford, Dorset, Devon,
Somerset, Wiltshire and Hampshire.
101GCC MOH 1921, p. 41.
102GA, CM/M/16/1 GEMSS MB, 1 May 1922.
103GA, CJ/M/8/1 GEMSS MB, 6 Oct. 1923.
104NA:PRO MH/66/ 91, ‘Appendix 6’, p. 9.
105GA, CJ/M/8/1GEMSS MB, 8 Sept. 1923;
CJ/M/8/8 GEMSS MB, 5 Oct. 1931.
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voluntary hospital work, both through payments for services (initially through the generous
block grant arrangement) and capital projects (architects’ fees, building loans, etc.).106
Agreement was also reached to knit the GEMSS into the local hospitals’ contributory
schemes, whereby contributors were excused user charges at municipal hospitals and paid
reduced charges for their children.107 Another area of partial achievement was research.
First, experimental treatment of parenchymatous goitre by iodine administration was
trialled at various out-stations, though with inconclusive results. Second, there was a
collaborative arrangement with Bristol University Centre of Cardiac Research, whereby
children identified at the out-stations with signs of rheumatic heart disease were examined
by specialists.108 Finally, there was a minor advance in joint working between cottage
and general hospitals, with nurses from Lydney receiving training at Bristol Royal
Infirmary.109
Perhaps the best opportunity to develop the scheme in a more substantial way was that
presented by the Local Government Act. This provided for the transfer of the Poor Law
from the boards of guardians to the council, and one aim was that the existing Poor Law
medical services should be brought under health committees, rather than the public assis-
tance committees, which now oversaw poor relief. In addition it was hoped that many of the
old workhouse infirmaries would be ‘‘appropriated’’ by health committees and developed
as municipal hospitals, free of the stigma of pauperism. None of this was mandatory, but
was strongly desired by theMinistry of Health, in the interest of bringing all public medical
services under the control of the MOHs. In the early 1930s Middleton Martin therefore
hoped to realize his original vision of out-stations which provided ‘‘more general con-
sultation services for insured persons, Public Assistance patients and the general public at
modified fees’’.110 In the event he was frustrated. He failed to assert the dominance of the
MOH over county health services, and the public assistance committee continued to
organize its medical services separately. Nor did he push strongly for transfer of the
county’s main public assistance institutions at Cheltenham, Tetbury and Thornbury to
the control of the health committee. Instead he concentrated on a plan ‘‘to introduce . . . a
system analogous to that under which the National Health Insurance service is worked’’,
whereby public assistance patients would be treated at out-stations ‘‘by any doctor willing
to undertake the work on a capitation basis’’.111 However, to his chagrin the council did not
immediately decide to use the ‘‘machinery of the Treatment Scheme’’ for this purpose.112
After much delay and negotiation with the Ministry of Health, a small pilot scheme for
Poor Law domiciliary relief in the Forest of Dean was finally put forward for ministerial
approval.113 This however was turned down ‘‘on its administrative shortcomings’’ and,
with his retirement now imminent, Middleton Martin abandoned the project.114
106GA, CJ/M/8/4 GEMSS MB, 4 Sept.,
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110 Ibid., p. 27.
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Under the new MOH, Kenneth Cowan, the scheme’s history becomes more difficult to
trace.115 From 1937 the annual MOH reports make no mention of the GEMSS, nor do they
furnish statistics on its operation. Also, the management committee was downgraded to
become a sub-committee of public health and housing, although the dominance of the
education committee was ended by this restructuring.116 However, it continued to function
much as before, achieving further internal rationalization when it took over the MCW
committee’s responsibilities for hospital treatment of under-fives.117 The out-stations and
the orthopaedic schemes continued to operate, and a new orthoptic clinic was established
at Bristol Eye Hospital. In 1939 Filton Health Centre in North Bristol was approved, to
provide orthopaedic, dental, ante-natal and minor ailments clinics, a TB dispensary and a
child welfare centre, though in the event the new centre was co-opted for war service as a
first-aid post.118 By the 1940s then, the functions of the GEMSS were continuing, albeit
disrupted by war, but it had effectively ceased to exist in name, disappearing with its
progenitor, Middleton Martin.
Conclusion
The GEMSS was an imaginative plan which illustrates the scope for innovation afforded
by the devolved health system of inter-war Britain. It was genuinely distinctive in four
respects: the concept of general purpose out-stations went against the more typical practice
of single-service clinics; its systematic outreach arrangements for rural areas were unusual;
its reliance on private sector contracting contrasted with the standard municipal preference
for public medical officers; and it offered a coherent and unique model of joint working
premised on a hierarchical referral network. However, its ambitious conception was never
realized. Despite the publicity which it generated, its practical achievement was very
modest, and limited principally to the effective integration of the School Medical Service
into the health system.
What light does this local example shed on the growth of support for regional
integration? The explanation has stressed the importance of individual agency at the
sub-national level, and Middleton Martin should be understood as one of the coterie of
inter-war MOHs, such as John Buchan in Bradford, John Parlane Kinloch in Aberdeen and
Robert Veitch Clark in Manchester, who attempted to innovate within the permissive
framework of local government.119 Their efforts illustrate the capacity of mid-level
civil servants to exploit existing legislation to develop new structures of social welfare.
While there may have been a tendency towards self-interested ‘‘maximizing’’ of rewards in
this (Middleton Martin’s own salary proposals for instance), the motivation seems to have
been largely pragmatic. The statistical and epidemiological analyses which were by now a
115Cowan went on to be MOH for Essex County
Council, 1949–54, then Chief Medical Officer to the
Scottish Department of Health, 1954–64, Who was
who, 1971–1980, London, Adam & Charles Black,
1981, p. 177.
116GA, CJ/M/8/15 GEMSS MB.
117GA, CJ/M/8/15 GEMSS MB, 3 Jan. 1938.
118 Ibid., 5 July 1937; GA, CJ/M8/17 GEMSSMB,
4 Sept. 1939, 29 April 1940.
119T Willis, ‘The Bradford Municipal Hospital
experiment of 1920: the emergence of the mixed
economy in hospital provision in inter-war Britain’, in
MGorsky andSSheard (eds),Financingmedicine: the
British experience since 1750, London, Routledge,
2006; Gorsky, op. cit., note 13 above; Pickstone,
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requisite part of the MOH’s toolkit exposed the dimensions of the problem, and practical
experience suggested solutions.
However, there was also an ideological component, and here Middleton Martin repre-
sents different currents of contemporary thought. First, there was an implicit faith in the
inexorability and rightness of the advance of state medicine: this was, as Arthur News-
holme later put it, ‘‘an essential condition . . . in a civilised community’’.120 Second there
were the conflicting visions of public medical provision articulated in the 1909 Majority
and Minority Reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws. On the one hand there
was the Minority Report’s enthusiasm for medical relief provided through a unified local
authority service, and on the other the Majority Report’s belief that co-ordination through
provident dispensaries and GP contracting was the optimal solution.121 It was the contra-
dictions in these two routes to integration which the Gloucestershire scheme sought to
reconcile, by establishing a publicly-funded, non-discriminatory service, yet at the same
time circumscribing the growth of the state by employing private practitioners.
Finally, what does the relative failure of the GEMSS experiment reveal of the barriers to
service integration within the mixed economy of inter-war medicine? First, the doctors
themselves were not resistant to this model. State contracting of GP services was viewed
favourably by the BMA, whose 1928 report on ‘‘encroachment’’ on private practice by
local authorities had recommended acceptance of the growth of public specialist clinics,
though staffed by part-time GPs; the advantages of this over full-time public health doctors
were deemed to be the GPs’ greater local knowledge and experience, their need to maintain
reputation, and the benefits of drawing them into preventive and public health work.122
Gloucestershire doctors reached a similar conclusion in 1932 when a review of the GEMSS
decided that there was no abuse of the system on financial or medical grounds; it found that
since out-station medical officers were local GPs with a knowledge of their patients’
circumstances there was little scope for better-off families to exploit the service.123
If the doctors were no barrier, the same could not be said for local or central government.
Gloucestershire’s reluctance to approve additional rate-borne expenditure to fund the
GEMSS as initially envisaged is a reminder of the resource constraints affecting inter-
war municipal medicine. Moreover, joint working between council committees did not
prove straightforward, as departmental autonomy militated against the vision of co-ordi-
nated services. When Middleton Martin complained that the education committee did not
have ‘‘an instinctive alliance’’ with the health committee’s goals, he was voicing a com-
mon complaint.124 Indeed similar turf wars had raged in Whitehall since 1914, when the
Board of Education and the Local Government Board argued over responsibility for
maternal education and infant welfare, then again in 1919 when the Board avoided sur-
rendering its powers to the newly created Ministry of Health.125 The unwillingness of
120Sir A Newsholme, Medicine and the state: the
relation between the private and official practice of
medicine with special reference to public health,
London, 1932, p. 29; for Newsholme, see notes 23
and 57 above.
121Sturdy (ed.), op. cit., note 58 above, pp. 242–9.
122 ‘Interim report on encroachments on the sphere
of private practice by the activities of local
authorities’, Br. med. J., Supplement, Nov. 1928,
pp. 185–95, esp. paras 16, 17.
123GA, CJ/M/8/10 GEMSS MB, 7 Nov. 1932.
124Parsons, op. cit., note 24 above, p. 27.
125Eyler, op. cit., note 23 above, pp. 324–33;
Harris,Health of the schoolchild, op. cit., note 3 above,
pp. 98–102.
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Gloucestershire’s public assistance committee to bring the Poor Lawmedical service under
the MOH’s empire was also not untypical. Elsewhere too, the aspiration of unifying local
services was thwarted by the permissive nature of the Local Government Act, as public
assistance bodies (many of which included ex-guardians) proved reluctant to surrender
their powers. This might be because they wished to retain the discriminatory ethos of the
Poor Law, because they found the medical work satisfying, or because they worried about
cost.126 Gloucestershire is illustrative of both ideological and temperamental impediments:
the committee’s policy had a ‘‘carry-on character’’, due to its continuing ‘‘to view the
situation through Poor Law spectacles’’, while ‘‘the less the Medical Officer of Health and
the Public Assistance Officer see of each other the better each is pleased’’.127
Conceivably these difficulties might have been overcome with a strong lead from the
centre, but government had been lukewarm from the first, when ‘‘owing to the sudden
economy panic . . . the scheme was cut down by the Ministry of Health’’.128 Why, though,
was grant aid not forthcoming later, and the integration of public assistance work with the
out-stations unsupported? Internal ministry correspondence suggests that civil servants had
little enthusiasm for the GEMSS model, believing that the ‘‘general practitioner seldom
makes a really satisfactory official’’.129 Instead they preferred the gradual development of
specialist services staffed by full-time public health officials answerable to the MOH.
While it is arguable that this represented a consistent and justifiable policy, the failure even
to explore alternative service delivery options is surely illustrative of the ‘‘insipid
aspirations’’ of the inter-war Ministry of Health.130
The Gloucestershire scheme was an innovative project akin to the joint hospitals coun-
cils founded in major provincial cities. Such initiatives showed that a more comprehensive
and equitable service might have been achievable through contracting mechanisms
within the existing mix of public, voluntary and private provision. However, financial
constraint, the permissive nature of central/local relations, and the lack of dynamic leader-
ship from the Ministry of Health meant that best practice was not supported, nor extended.
This left open the space for Aneurin Bevan’s solution of a free and universal service
established through a major advance of state medicine.
126Fifteenth annual report of the Ministry of
Health, Cmd. 4664, PP 1933–34, XII 265, pp. 45–54.
127Parsons, op. cit., note 24 above, pp. 127,
189–90, 200.
128GCC MOH 1929, p. 30.
129NA:PRO MH 66/90 Minute Sheet, 24 Dec.
1932, H MacEwen to Wrigley.
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government, London, Allen & Unwin, 1954,
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